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Abstract
Most Act-Utilitarians, including Singer are Permissivists who claim that their theory usually permits abortion. 
In contrast, a minority, including Hare and Tännsjö, are Restrictionists who assert that Act-Utilitarianism 
(AU) usually limits abortion. I argue that both Permissivists and Restrictionists have misunderstood AU’s 
radical implications for abortion: AU entails that abortion is, in most cases in the economically developed 
world, morally obligatory. According to AU, it is morally obligatory for A to do F in circumstances C if and 
only if A’s doing F in C produces at least as much total net value as any other action that A could do in C. As 
mentioned above, AU has generally been seen to be fairly permissive about abortion. A little more exactly, 
AU is usually thought to hold that abortion is morally permissible in most cases, even during the second 
and third trimester. But not all AUs are Permissivists. Restrictionists maintain that the value of the future 
good that the fetus will experience over an entire life is likely to often outweigh the value of the good that its 
female parent will lose if the fetus is not aborted. Neither Permissivists nor Restrictionists have understood 
AU’s implications for abortion, at least as it concerns those living in economically developed countries 
today. First, Restrictionists have failed to recognize the marginal costs that a person in the developed 
world incurs on future people. One life lived now in the developed world consumes more resources (and 
contributes more to global warming) than a life lived in the developing world, and in the process makes the 
prospects of future people considerably worse. Restrictionists ignore these costs when they claim that it is 
often morally impermissible to abort fetuses. Second, Permissivists have not gone far enough when they 
have claimed that abortion is morally permissible. Singer and others have argued that we in the developed 
world ought to redirect much of our wealth to the underdeveloped world because its marginal value is much 
higher there than here. But the average cost of raising a child in the United States is almost $13,000 per year. 
Hence, by forgoing a child (including aborting a fetus) one can save and maintain, on average, between 6 
and 65 people per year. Thus, AU entails that almost everyone in the developed world who is financially 
capable of supporting a child should not do so, even if that means aborting a fetus.
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Introduction 
This article is about the implications of act utilitarianism for the ethics of abortion and 
reproduction, especially as it directly affects people living in economically developed 
countries, people very much like most of those who are likely to read this article. While 
my focus throughout the article is on decisions regarding abortion, this is largely because 
there is already a literature on this topic with which to engage. The arguments I shall 
make are generalizable to all reproduction decisions, including those involving the use 
of contraception, voluntary sterilization, and family planning more broadly. I argue that 
(1) act utilitarians generally misunderstand the implications of their theory for the ethics 
of abortion and reproduction, and that (2) these implications are surprisingly extreme. 
In particular, act utilitarians are committed by their theory to the view that many—even 
most —women in economically developed countries are morally required to have abor-
tions if they become pregnant. More generally, act utilitarians should say that many of us 
in economically developed countries are morally required not to reproduce at all. 
Establishing this result involves significant unpacking. In section 1, I set the stage for my 
argument by clarifying what precisely I mean by the phrase “act utilitarianism” and what 
sort of norms I have in mind. I also introduce the article’s main protagonist, Ute, a preg-
nant middle-class woman living in an economically developed country who is consider-
ing having an abortion. In section 2, I consider what I call the permissivist interpretation 
of act utilitarianism, which holds that in general it is morally permissible for people in 
Ute’s position to have an abortion. I contend here that the permissivist interpretation fits 
poorly with the mainstream understanding of act utilitarianism. In section 3, I turn to 
what I call the restrictivist interpretation of act utilitarianism, which holds that in general 
it is morally impermissible for people in Ute’s position to have an abortion. In section 
4, I make the case that, though restrictivists are closer to the spirit of act utilitarianism, 
they do not consider fully the implications of the opportunity cost of having children in 
economically developed countries and, in the process, of using resources inefficiently 
to help others, especially others living in economically developing countries. I conclude 
that the correct interpretation of act utilitarianism is the obligatoriness interpretation, 
which—startlingly, in my opinion—holds that women in Ute’s position are morally re-
quired to have abortions. More generally, it is morally required for men and women in 
Ute’s economic position not to reproduce. Finally, in section 5, I consider and respond to 
various possible confusions about my argument and answer some potential objections. 
Stage Setting
Though there were more things in heaven and earth than were dreamt of in Horatio’s 
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philosophy, utilitarians think of everything. As a result, we face an embarras des richesses 
when we turn to various formulations of act utilitarianism. Indeed, there seem to be 
more versions of utilitarianism than there are utilitarians. My aim in this article is only 
to provide a broad statement of the theory that fits most, though not all, versions of 
act utilitarianism while remaining agnostic about the countless disagreements among 
proponents of the theory that are not relevant here. Let us say that according to act 
utilitarians,
it is morally permissible for agent X to do action F in circumstances C if and 
only if X’s doing F is optimal, i.e., there is no other act G such that X’s doing G 
in C would produce more total net utility than X’s doing F in C. All nonoptimal 
acts are morally impermissible.
It bears repeating that there is more to the conceptual geography of act utilitarianism 
than is covered in this statement, and act utilitarians disagree regarding such questions 
as whether our concerns should be with actual or expected outcomes; and whether util-
ity should be understood in terms of pleasure and pain, preference satisfaction and frus-
tration, or an “objective list” of goods. These disagreements will have little to no impact 
on my discussion here. Yet let me also be clear that what I say here does not apply to 
some alternative forms of non-act utilitarianism, such as satisficing utilitarianism,1 rule 
utilitarianism,2 and motive utilitarianism.3
Moreover, a general caveat about act utilitarianism is in order here. By its very nature, 
act utilitarianism does not classify common-sense act types as either morally permissi-
ble or morally impermissible. Let me explain. Common-sense act types are those kinds 
of actions that are denoted by the folk ontology of our ordinary language. Common-
sense act types include such things as joking, grading papers, playing chess, making 
omelets, flirting, and squinting. Being optimal (in the sense defined above) is decidedly 
not a common-sense act type. Moreover, there is no necessary connection between ac-
tions such as joking, grading papers, etc. and being optimal. Sometimes one maximizes 
utility by telling a joke, but, alas, sometimes one does not. As a result, act utilitarianism 
1  Michael Slote, Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism (London: Kegan and Routledge, 1985); 
Jason Rogers, “In Defense of a Version of Satisficing Consequentialism,” Utilitas 22, no. 2 (2010): 198–221.
2  Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1979); Brad Hooker, Ideal 
Code, Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
3  Robert Merrihew Adams, “Motive Utilitarianism,” Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 14: 467–81; James Skid-
more, “Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Might’? How to Resolve the Conflict between Act and Motive Utilitarianism,” 
Philosophia 46, no. 1 (2018): 207–21.
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classifies such actions as abortion and reproduction as morally impermissible only in a 
rough-and-ready way by classifying most of the tokens of this type of action as morally 
impermissible. It is more than enough for the purposes of this article to show that act 
utilitarianism makes this loose but serviceable classification. I shall return to this point 
below. 
I now turn to the type of norms with which I am concerned here. My focus is on the 
moral norms that govern individual actions. While it is generally recognized both out-
side and inside philosophy that there is a distinction between moral and legal norms, this 
distinction is especially important in the case of act utilitarianism. There may be many 
circumstances, according to act utilitarians, in which performing a particular action 
would be optimal, even though a law requiring the action would have suboptimal—or 
even highly undesirable—consequences. The questions of whether and under what con-
ditions abortions morally ought to be legal are momentous, but these questions are dis-
tinct from the issues under consideration here. The same can be said, and with even more 
certainty, regarding the legality or illegality of contraception and sterilization. My focus 
is on the moral rightness or wrongness of particular actions undertaken by men, women, 
and their healthcare professionals to the exclusion of these larger questions about legality 
and illegality. 
Finally, let me introduce my protagonist, Ute. Ute is a middle-class American woman 
with a secure and steady income. She is 2.5 months pregnant, and her fetus is healthy and 
does not have any impairments that would be likely to prevent it from eventually having 
a life worth living. But having a child is a weighty decision, and Ute wonders whether 
she should have an abortion or become a mother. For the purposes of the matters under 
discussion, let us say that no one else is directly or significantly affected by Ute’s decision 
except her fetus. Now, Ute also happens to be an act utilitarian. The simplest way to see 
what is at the heart of this paper is to ask, What does Ute’s own ethical theory tell her that 
she is morally permitted or required to do? 
Act Utilitarian Permissivism about Abortion 
No one has contributed more toward our understanding of how act utilitarianism applies 
to significant, real-world moral issues than Peter Singer. His applications of act utilitari-
anism to the ethics of issues such as famine relief,4 our treatment of nonhuman animals,5 
4  Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 229–43.
5  Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: Random House, 
1975). 
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our relationship with our environment,6 and our food choices7 are too well known to 
require rehearsing here. So it is natural enough to begin by asking how Singer might 
advise Ute. 
Of course, like any act utilitarian, Singer would tell Ute that the moral permissibility or 
impermissibility of having an abortion depends of the total net amount of utility pro-
duced by each of the possible choices she can make. Ex hypothesi, Ute’s decision affects 
herself and her fetus, but it does not affect anyone else to a noteworthy degree. However, 
Singer also maintains that the value of a pregnant woman’s utility (i.e., her interests) far 
outweighs that of the fetus. “My suggestion, then, is that we accord the life of the fetus 
no greater value than the life of a nonhuman animal at a similar level of rationality, self-
consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel . . . a woman’s serious interests would normally 
override the rudimentary interests even of a conscious fetus.”8 
Hence, according to Singer we should strongly discount the fetus’s interests, even if it 
were conscious at this stage. Singer would conclude that it is morally permissible for Ute 
to have an abortion, though also morally permissible for her not to have one if that were 
optimal for her lifetime utility instead. 
It is worth commenting on Singer’s belief that the utility of even a conscious fetus should 
be discounted, if not to zero, then to something close to it. This belief raises questions 
about whether the utility of a conscious newborn should also be discounted. Singer’s ad-
vocacy of the moral permissibility of some cases of infanticide has drawn passionate and 
sometimes intemperate—even tasteless—responses. While this is not the place to discuss 
infanticide, I want to draw attention to the fact that supporters of permissivist act utili-
tarianism do owe us a principled account of when we should stop discounting the utility 
of human beings. The mere fact that the entity is no longer in a woman’s womb does not 
appear to be the sort of fact that act utilitarians are likely to see as salient. As yet, this 
needed account is sketchy at best. I mention this fact here in part because I want to set 
up a brief discussion in the next section of a less well-noticed problem for the restrictivist 
interpretation of act utilitarianism to which this provides an interesting contrast. More 
about that briefly.
6  Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
7  Peter Singer and Jim Mason, The Ethics of What We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter (New York: Ro-
dale, 2006).
8  Peter Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 156–57.
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However, I have another reason for lingering on the matter of the value of the utility of a 
newborn, but it will take a moment to discharge this thought fully. When discussing the 
possibility of morally permissible infanticide, Singer uses the example of children with 
spina bifida, noting that “some doctors closely connected with children suffering from 
severe spina bifida believe that the lives of the worst affected children are so miserable 
that it is wrong to resort to surgery to keep them alive.”9 Singer’s reasoning appears to 
be that it might be morally permissible to euthanize infants with spina bifida not only 
because of the suffering that they are now undergoing but also because their lives as a 
whole will be short, painful, and frustrating, while the life of other future humans who 
could replace them is likely to be much better. What is especially worth remarking upon 
here is that Singer considers not only the present utility of the infant with spina bifida; 
he also considers her future utility and compares it to the utility of another, merely pos-
sible, future person. Indeed, at times Singer is willing both to consider the future utility 
not only of an infant but also of a fetus. In a discussion of fetuses with Down’s syndrome, 
Singer writes, “Children with this condition have intellectual disabilities and most will 
never be able to live independently. . . . Undergoing [amniocentesis] implies that if the 
test for Down’s syndrome is positive, the woman will consider aborting the fetus and, 
if she still wishes to have another child, will start another pregnancy, which has a good 
chance of being normal. Prenatal diagnosis, followed by abortion in selected cases, is 
common practice. . . . This is as it should be.”10 Yet a question for Singer and other per-
missivist act utilitarians naturally arises here: If we should take the future utility and 
disutility of a fetus with Down’s syndrome seriously, then why should we not do likewise 
with regard to Ute’s fetus? And if Ute’s fetus will have a positive sum of net utility over its 
life, then why would the fact that the fetus is not currently sentient give one any reason 
to discount that utility? Discounting in this way seems contrary to one of the virtues of 
act utilitarianism: its ability to take future goods and future people into consideration.11 
For roughly this reason, some act utilitarians have argued that taking the future utility 
of the fetus seriously leads to a very different judgment about the moral permissibility 
of abortion, as we shall see in the next section.
Finally, it should not escape our notice that Singer’s permissivist act utilitarianism re-
garding abortion clearly extends to other kinds of reproductive decisions as well. If it is 
the case that it is morally permissible to terminate a pregnancy in Ute’s case, there is no 
obvious reason why it would not also be morally permissible to prevent the pregnancy 
9  Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life, 135.
10  Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 137.
11  Tim Mulgan, Future People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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from occurring at all, either by using contraception or by having a surgical procedure 
to prevent the possibility of pregnancy. Again, if it is morally permissible for Ute to pre-
vent the pregnancy from occurring, there is no palpable reason why it would not also 
be morally permissible for men or women in economic circumstances similar to Ute’s to 
prevent pregnancies from occurring. This fact sets up a stark difference to the position 
developed in the next section.
Act Utilitarian Restrictivism about Abortion
In contrast to Singer, Torbjörn Tännsjö argues that “utilitarianism is . . . much less abor-
tion-friendly than expected. . . . According to utilitarianism, it is normally wrong to 
abort a fetus, which would have developed into a happy individual, who could lead his 
or her happy life at the expense of no one else.”12 A reconstruction of Tännsjö’s reason-
ing is straightforward. First, recognize two possible worlds:
1. Abortion World, in which there are n people experiencing m amount of utility, 
and
2. Non-Abortion World, in which there are n+1 people experiencing m* utility.
Next, compare m and m*. If m > m*, then abortion is the morally required choice, and 
if m < m*, then forgoing an abortion is the morally required choice. Only if m = m* 
(a fairly unlikely possibility) are both options morally permissible, as Singer and act-
12  Torbjörn Tännsjö, Taking Life: Three Theories on the Ethics of Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 181. Note that it is clear from the context of Tännsjö’s discussion that by “utilitarianism” he means 
act utilitarianism. He is quite hostile to non–act utilitarian approaches such as rule utilitarianism. 
The reader might wonder why I concentrate on Tännsjö’s thinking, as thoughtful and rigorous as it is. 
Why? R. M. Hare was one of the most philosophically sophisticated act utilitarians of the twentieth cen-
tury, and he offered two novel and intriguing arguments against the moral permissibility of abortion. 
However, Hare’s arguments proceed from premises that are more at home in the Golden Rule and Kantian 
traditions than in those of act utilitarianism. This was the case because Hare believed that broadly Kan-
tian, utilitarian, and Golden Rule ethical theories could be reconciled with one another. See Hare, “Abor-
tion and the Golden Rule,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 3, no. 4 (1975): 201–22; “A Kantian Approach to 
Abortion,” in Right Conduct: Theories and Applications, ed. Michael D. Bayles and Kenneth Henley (New 
York: Random House, 1988), 168–84; and “Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?” Utilitas 5, no. 1 (1993): 
1–16. This idea has recently revived in Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 404–19.
Volume 20, Issue 1Essays in Philosophy
8 | eP1622 Essays in Philosophy
utilitarian permissivists claim is generally true.13 Turn now, in contrast, to Tännsjö’s 
advice to Ute. As already stated in section 1, her fetus is healthy and does not have any 
impairment that would be likely to prevent it from eventually having a life with more 
utility than disutility. In short, to borrow for act utilitarian purposes a phrase coined by 
Don Marquis, Ute’s fetus has a “future like ours,” a future of significant net utility.14 Un-
less the world in which Ute does not have an abortion is better than the world in which 
she does not by as much as the total amount of net utility that her fetus would have over 
the course of human life in an economically developed country, then Tännsjö and other 
restrictivists would argue that it is morally impermissible for Ute to have an abortion. 
And even though William James liked to joke that the question of whether a life was 
worth living depended on the liver, there is overwhelmingly good reason to think that 
a normal life lived in an economically developed country is rather good in terms of 
net utility and well-being, regardless of the particularities of the individual person, or 
“liver.”15 Would the total amount of utility that Ute experienced in Abortion World re-
ally outweigh all of the utility that would be experienced by the future person her fetus 
would become? It seems overwhelmingly unlikely. So Tännsjö would advise Ute that 
having an abortion is morally impermissible. 
Let me now touch briefly on the parallel between permissivists and restrictivists that 
I adumbrated in section 2. While permissivists appear to have a hard time explaining 
when we should stop discounting the utility of fetuses and perhaps even infants, restric-
tivists have the opposite problem. Since most of us who live middle-class lives in eco-
13  Precision about future utility in merely possible worlds is often more than we can reasonably hope for; 
see James Lenman, “Consequentialism and Cluelessness,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29, no. 4 (2000): 
342–70. This fact invites two responses that pull in somewhat different directions. First, we should not un-
derestimate the degree to which we can measure and the sophistication with which we can compare well-
being and utility. See the essays in Arthur A. Stone and Christopher Mackie, eds., Subjective Well-Being: 
Measuring Happiness, Suffering, and Other Measures of Experience (Washington, DC: National Academy 
of Science Press, 2013); as well as John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
Second, it is very often true that high degrees of precision are not required to make moral judgments. See 
Parfit, On What Matters. Finally, note that those cases in which a high degree of precision is required are 
problematic for utilitarianism in general, not for attempts to adjudicate between different interpretations 
of act utilitarianism vis-à-vis the moral permissibility of abortion.
14  Don Marquis, “Why Abortion Is Immoral,” Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 4 (1989): 183–202.
15  David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald, “Well-Being over Time in Britain and the USA,” Journal 
of Public Economics 88, no. 7-8 (2004): 1359–86. A response to antinatalists such as David Benatar is far 
beyond the scope of this paper, but see David Wasserman’s contribution to his collaboration with Benatar 
in David Benatar and David Wasserman, Debating Progression: Is It Wrong to Reproduce? (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2015). William James’s response to proto-antinatalists such as Schopenhauer is also 
worth careful attention. See William James, “Is Life Worth Living?” Ethics 6, no. 1 (1895): 1–24.
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nomically developed countries can bring far more happy humans into existence than 
we are currently doing, Tännsjö would not only advise Ute not to have an abortion, 
he would also say that she and most people reading this article are morally required 
to procreate as much as possible, subject to the restriction that we not subtract from 
the total net utility produced by the action. Indeed, we are committing a serious moral 
wrong if we fail to do so.16 This line of thinking raises obvious questions about Parfit’s 
repugnant conclusion that I can address here without straying too far from my topic.17 
That said, it is worth noting that Tännsjö himself expresses strong doubts about our 
initial aversion to the repugnant conclusion, though he takes care not to go so far as 
to embrace the conclusion itself.18
Act Utilitarian Obligatoriness about Abortion
For all of its cleverness and meticulousness, Tännsjö’s argument for the restrictivist 
interpretation of act utilitarianism doesn’t take the idea of opportunity cost seriously 
enough. This is the case because Tännsjö is content to let the moral rightness of Ute’s 
action be determined by a comparison between only two possible worlds: Abortion 
World and Non-Abortion World. But Tännsjö overlooks the fact that there are many 
possible Abortion Worlds, some of which have more utility in them than Non-Abor-
tion World (as I’ll explain in more detail in just a moment). The opportunity cost of 
choosing Non-Abortion World is the higher-utility Abortion World—hence the fail-
ure to maximize total net utility, as required by act utilitarianism.
Begin by considering the cost of raising a child in an economically developed coun-
try, such as the United States. In order to raise a single child, a household earning less 
than $60,000 will spend an average of $169,000, and a household earning between 
$60,000 and $103,000 will spend an average of $235,000, while one earning more than 
$103,000 will spend an average of $390,000.19 By way of contrast, the cost of raising a 
single child in an upper-middle class environment in India is much closer to an aver-
16  Tännsjö, Taking Life, 180. 
17  See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984): 381–90.
18  Tännsjö, Taking Life, 281.
19  Mark Lino, Kevin Kuczynski, Nestor Rodriguez, and TusaRebecca Schap, Expenditures on Children by 
Families (Washington, DC: US Department of Agriculture, Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion, 
2015). https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/sites/default/files/crc2015.pdf. 
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age of $80,000.20 More importantly, in economically developing countries that number 
is just slightly more than $16,000 on average.21 Yes, Ute could spend roughly $235,000 
raising a child, just as Tännsjö thinks she morally ought to. And, yes, it is reasonable to 
believe that Ute would thereby increase the world’s total net utility. But to put the mat-
ter rather crudely, she could raise the world’s total net utility more by paying people in 
developing countries to raise their own children. How much more? Even if the lives of 
these individuals were only half as good, in terms of total net utility, as the lives of peo-
ple in economically developed countries, Ute would be getting more than seven times 
the return for outsourcing the production of utility—something she could do only if she 
were to have an abortion.22 
Up to this point, I have limited myself to comparing similar goods, i.e., the utility of 
future people. However, it is possible to cast our net more widely and, in the process, 
see even better reasons for act utilitarians to conclude that Ute is morally obligated to 
terminate her fetus. Instead of paying others to raise children, Ute might more plau-
sibly  help to save lives. In fact, doing so is likely to be a better way of promoting total 
utility. As Singer himself notes, “It’s difficult to calculate how much it costs to save or 
transform the life of someone who is extremely poor. . . . Nevertheless . . . we can rea-
sonably believe that the cost of saving a life through one of these charities [e.g., Oxfam] 
is somewhere between $200 and $2,000.”23 Over the course of eighteen years, Ute could 
spend $235,000 raising one child in an economically developed country, or she could 
spend the same amount of money to save the lives of between 117 and 1,175 people liv-
ing in an economically developing country. Even if Ute were to raise a child cheaply and 
thereby spend something closer to what a household earning less than $60,000 spends 
on average, she could save between 84 and 845 lives instead. It is hard to believe that Ute 
faces much of a choice, at least from the perspective of act utilitarianism. Saving dozens 
or even hundreds of lives is likely to do a much better job of promoting total utility than 
20  “How Much Does It Cost to Raise a Child?” Times of India, February 2, 2018. https://timesofindia.india-
times.com/business/india-business/how-much-does-it-cost-to-raise-a-child/articleshow/62751407.cms.
21  UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children 2005. https://www.unicef.org/sowc05/english/.
22  She might be able to do something similar if she were to have the child and then give it up for adop-
tion. However, the money spent on prenatal care and giving birth could not be spent helping others have 
children, and the cost of raising the child would simply be redistributed elsewhere, which would not be 
efficient unless the child were adopted in an economically developing country. 
23  Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty (New York: Random House, 
2009), 103.
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raising one child.24 
We should note that Ute’s circumstances are hardly sui generis. Like many thought ex-
periments, mine involves implausible simplifying assumptions. However, we can relax 
these assumptions with little effect on the outcome. In most cases, those whose lifetime 
utility will be most affected by a choice of whether or not to have an abortion are the (po-
tential) parents and the child (if the abortion is not performed). Of course, the child will 
go on to have positive (and negative) effects on the lives of many other people, but that is 
true to a much greater degree of the many more children who could be raised abroad and 
the people whose lives could be saved but otherwise would not be. Ute’s circumstances 
are much like those of our students, colleagues, friends, and, perhaps, ourselves. 
To be sure, not everyone is in Ute’s circumstances, and for many women the opportunity 
cost of having a child is considerably less than is true in Ute’s case. Where that state of 
affairs holds, act utilitarians should be committed to the claim that it would be morally 
impermissible for these women to have abortions, just as Tännsjö suggests. Moreover, it 
seems especially likely that many of these women will live in countries that are less eco-
nomically developed since women in these countries will have few economic opportuni-
ties, all other things being equal. However, that fact in no way counts against my thesis 
in this article—namely, that act utilitarianism should be understood as making the claim 
that many, perhaps most, women in economically developed countries are morally re-
quired to have abortions if they become pregnant.
Misunderstandings, Objections, and Replies
One possible response to what I am calling act utilitarian obligatoriness about abortion 
is that my claim is true but only trivially so. Any reader of Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, 
and Morality,” the responder might say, can see for him- or herself that obligatoriness 
about abortion is the correct understanding of act utilitarianism. The responder might 
24  Note, of course, that act utilitarians are not committed to saying that no one in a developed country 
should reproduce. Compare the fact that act utilitarians seem committed to saying that in response to a 
famine each of us is morally obligated to give very generously to help alleviate the suffering it causes. See 
Tim Mulgan, Understanding Utilitarianism (Stocksfield, UK: Acumen, 2007), 93–114; and Krister Bykvist 
Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum: 2011), 98–111. But act utilitarians are not 
committed to saying that everyone should overcommit resources to the problem. According to act utili-
tarians, the moral obligations of each person are in part determined by whether others act on their moral 
obligations, and our moral obligations might become more demanding because others fail to meet theirs. 
Likewise, if we all behaved differently and prioritized the well-being of the most vulnerable, Ute might not 
be morally obligated to have an abortion. But to the extent that we continue to act as we do, act utilitarians 
ought to accept the obligatoriness interpretation of their theory. I expand on this point further in section 5.
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continue by saying that we might as well call my paper “Abortion, Affluence, and Moral-
ity” and put Singer’s name on it.
This line of response is confused for several reasons. First, the primary moral principle 
from which Singer works in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” is not act utilitarian but 
what we might call the “prevention conditional.” Singer expresses the prevention condi-
tional this way: “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without 
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do 
it.”25 It should be clear that the prevention conditional does not entail act utilitarianism 
since it requires only that we avoid bad states of affairs, not that we bring about the best 
state of affairs. Second, Singer himself did not intend for the prevention conditional to be 
understood as entailing act utilitarianism. As he wrote in a revision of his paper,
While I am myself inclined toward a utilitarian view, it was my aim in writing 
“Famine, Affluence, and Morality” to produce an argument which would appeal 
not only to utilitarians, but also to anyone who accepted the initial premises of 
the argument, which seemed to me likely to have a very wide acceptance. So I 
tried to get around the need to produce a complete ethical theory by allowing 
my readers to fill in their own version—within limits—of what is morally 
significant, and then see what the moral consequences are.26
Third and finally, if the connection between Singer’s views—or the views of any act utili-
tarian—so manifestly supported the obligatoriness about abortion interpretation of act 
utilitarianism, then it is remarkable that neither Singer nor anyone else pointed this out. 
Quite the contrary is true. 
A second possible response to the obligatoriness about abortion interpretation of act 
utilitarianism focuses on the consequences that would come about as a result of every-
one like Ute not having children. If, the responder might urge, most economically de-
veloped countries were to suddenly fall well below the population replacement rate, it 
would result in a catastrophe for the entire world. For, within a generation or so, global 
GDP would fall precipitously, and then there would be little or nothing for people in the 
developed world to transfer to the less economically developed world.
This response is understandable but also confused. Act utilitarianism concerns itself 
25  Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (revised version), retrieved from https://www.utilitarian.net/
singer/by/1972----.htm.
26  Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (revised version).
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primarily with the rightness or wrongness of individual decisions and actions, and it 
does so against the background of other decisions and actions that are independent of 
the agent and might very well not be influenced by act utilitarianism or any similar ethi-
cal theory. True, Ute’s obligation to terminate her pregnancy and devote her time, effort, 
and money elsewhere is contingent upon others not also doing so in large enough num-
bers to destroy the world economy. But this contingency is remarkably well grounded, 
and it is highly unlikely that many will follow her example. Of course, act utilitarianism’s 
high degree of demandingness is well understood, and few act utilitarians (and perhaps 
even fewer among us who are not act utilitarians) expect many people to act in accor-
dance with the demands of morality as act utilitarians see them in this case. However, 
none of these considerations affect Ute’s moral obligations, according to act utilitarians. 
To be certain, an act utilitarian would claim that she is obligated to sacrifice a great deal 
to save children drowning in a pond. That is true even if other people who were able 
to do so did not help. And it is true even if, were all of these people to try to help, the 
outcome would be counterproductive. By the very same token, an act utilitarian would 
claim that she is obligated to forgo having children to save lives, even if other people 
who were able to do so did not help by forgoing and saving these lives and even if, were 
they all to try to do so, the result would be disastrous.27 In contrast, rule utilitarians 
would arrive at a very different conclusion regarding Ute’s moral obligations since they 
focus on the question of the consequences that would follow if all or, in Brad Hooker’s 
words, “an overwhelming majority” of us internalized a given set of rules.28 But act utili-
tarians are not rule utilitarians—or even crypto rule utilitarians.29 So when attempting 
to determine what Ute’s—and our—obligations are, they do not, and should not, ask 
“What if everyone did that?” The answer to that question is simply irrelevant for them 
unless there is good reason to think everyone really will do that.
A third possible response to act utilitarianism obligatoriness about abortion is that my 
argument for it ignores the costs involved with increased population for both individu-
als and our environment. If, the responder might say, Ute forwent raising her own child 
and instead used the resources she would have spent doing so either by saving the lives 
of other children or adults or by making their lives possible, then she would also in-
crease the total population of the world and, for example, thereby increase the levels of 
27  Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Tim Mulgan, The Demands of 
Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
28  Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, 7.
29  Parfit, On What Matters, 251–256.
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greenhouse gases produced. In the process she would be diminishing the total amount 
of utility that the world’s population would experience.
While this response raises a number of issues that are impossible to treat adequately in 
this paper, it is a fairly easy matter to show that they are not a threat to act utilitarianism 
obligatoriness about abortion. Let us begin with the question of environmental impact. 
Though it is true that, all other things being equal, more humans mean increased pro-
duction of greenhouse gases, not all things really are equal here. Take CO2 emissions. In 
2015, the average resident of the United States produced 16.07 metric tons of CO2. But 
in India, for instance, that number was almost an order of magnitude lower at 1.87 met-
ric tons, and there were many less economically developed countries—from the Solo-
mon Islands to Burundi—in which that average was lower than 1 metric ton.30 So it is far 
from obvious that the net impact on the environment of Ute’s decision would cause an 
increase in total CO2 production. While it is possible to make similar arguments regard-
ing other kinds of concerns about environmental damage, doing so here would take us 
too far afield, especially in light of the point I make in the next paragraph.
There is a more direct way of replying to this criticism of act utilitarian obligatoriness 
about abortion, a way that does not involve us in the admittedly difficult question of 
trying to answer “How many people should there be?,” as Derek Parfit put it.31 There 
are many ways to increase the total amount of utility in the world that do not have a 
significant impact on world population. Ute might, for instance, devote her time and 
resources to the project of providing relief to the billion or so already existing human 
beings who suffer from intestinal worms. These worms cause considerable suffering to 
those who have them and also put those with the infection at increased risk of devel-
oping anemia, intestinal obstructions, and a suppressed immune system, which can in 
turn contribute to the likelihood of contracting diseases like malaria. Moreover, having 
intestinal worms can also interfere considerably with people’s ability to attend school 
when they are children and to work when they are adults. However, treatment for this 
condition is well understood and highly cost-effective. Recent research done in Kenya 
suggests that each $100 spent on deworming children increases total school attendance 
in that country by ten years. Adults who had been dewormed as children work an aver-
age of 3.4 hours more per week than those who did not, and they earn on average 20 
30  The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Re-
search (EDGAR). “CO2 Time Series 1990–2015 Per Capita for World Countries,” updated October 30, 
2017, http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=CO2ts_pc1990-2015.
31  Derek Parfit, “Overpopulation and the Quality of Life,” in The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Popula-
tion Ethics, ed. Jesper Ryberg and Torbjörn Tännsjö (Dordrecht, NL: Springer, 2004), 7.
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percent more than those who went untreated.32 Hence, even if we grant the responder 
that marginal increases in the total global population might, all things considered, lead 
to marginal decreases in net global utility (a concession I make here only for the sake 
of argument), it is still manifest that someone like Ute can contribute much more to net 
global utility by engaging in cost-effective behavior to help people who are already alive 
than by raising a child in an economically developed world.33
A fourth response to act utilitarian obligatoriness about abortion might question the 
focus on abortion per se rather than other ways in which Ute and others might avoid 
having children in order to pursue projects much more likely to increase net global 
utility. Why, the responder might ask, focus only on a controversial medical procedure 
instead of on both male and female contraception or sterilization? 
I have very little to disagree with regarding this response. As I mentioned in the intro-
duction, the one and only reason I have focused on abortion in this essay is that there 
was already enough of an existing literature on abortion and act utilitarianism to allow 
me to get some purchase on the difficult issues at hand. But I agree that act utilitar-
ians are also committed by their theory to the claim that, with regard to both men and 
women in roughly Ute’s economic circumstances, the use of contraception is morally 
obligatory and voluntary sterilization may be required. Nothing about act utilitarianism 
requires that, in general, women bear most, much less all, of the burden. But as we have 
seen in Ute’s particular circumstances, the use of contraception is no longer a relevant 
possibility. That, and only that, is why act utilitarians ought to claim that she is morally 
obligated to terminate her pregnancy. 
A fifth and final response that might be made in response to act utilitarian obligatori-
ness about abortion concerns the fact that our moral obligations regarding not only 
abortion but many other reproductive decisions would be very different if we lived un-
der different social, political, and economic institutions. If, the responder might say, Ute 
lived in an economically developed country in which the needs of most disadvantaged 
humans on the planet were taken seriously, then Ute would not be morally required to 
forgo reproduction.
Yet even if the country that one lives in does much to help those who are most in need 
elsewhere, the real issue is elsewhere for an act utilitarian. She might adapt a line from 
32  William MacAskill, Doing Good Better: Effective Altruism and a Radical New Way to Make a Difference 
(New York: Avery, 2015), 8–9.
33  I am grateful to Roger Crisp for prompting me to see this point.
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American president John F. Kennedy to say that Ute should ask not what her country is 
doing for those most in need of help but what she can do for those most in need of help. 
Even if Ute’s country were doing a great deal to help those most in need, it is still pos-
sible—likely, even—that her contributions to total global net utility would be greater if 
she forwent reproduction.34
I conclude by reminding my readers of the purpose of this article. I have argued that 
act utilitarians generally misunderstand the implications of their theory for the ethics 
of abortion and for reproductive choices more generally. Moreover, I argued that these 
implications are surprisingly extreme. It was not my intention to persuade the reader 
that act utilitarianism is the correct moral theory. I have nothing novel to say about the 
matter, though perhaps some might think that the obligatoriness interpretation is a case 
of reduction ad absurdum for act utilitarianism. Furthermore, it is not my intention to 
persuade a non–act utilitarian reader that Ute is morally required to have an abortion. 
That said, many of us who are not act utilitarians are also concerned with improving the 
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